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WASHINGTON
LAW REVIEW
VOLUME X. NOVEMBER, 1935 NUMBER 4
MORAL OBLIGATION AS CONSIDERATION FOR A
PROMISE IN WASHINGTON
ROBERT L. PALmER*
Moral obligation has been defined as a duty which one owes and
which he ought to perform, but which he is not legally bound to
fulfill.' In order better to understand this doctrine as applied
specifically to the Washington cases and law, let us consider the
history and a brief statement of the principle.
HISTORY AND STATEMENT OF THE DOCTRINE
The doctrine that a moral obligation may be a sufficient con-
sideration for a promise seems to have been first enunciated in
early English cases by Lord Mansfield. In the case of Atkins v. H$7l2
where it was held that assumpsit would lie against an executor
personally upon his promise to pay a legacy m consideration of
there being sufficient assets, he remarked "It is the case of a
promise made upon a good and valuable consideration which in
all cases is a sufficient ground to support an action. It is so in
cases of obligations, which would otherwise only bind a man's
conscience, and which without such a promise he could not be
compelled to pay" In the similar case of Ifawkes v. Saunders3
Lord Mansfield again said. "Where a man is under a legal or
equitable obligation to pay, the law implies a promise though none
was actually made. A fortiori, a legal or equitable duty is a suf-
ficient consideration for an actual promise. Where a man is under
a moral obligation, which no court of law or equity can enforce,
and promises, the honesty and rectitude of the thing is a consider-
ation. As if a man pronises to pay a just debt, the recovery of
which is barred by the statute of limitations, or if a man after
he comes of age, promises to pay a meritorious debt contracted
during his mnority, but not for necessaries, or if a bankrupt, in
affluent circumstances, after his certificate, promises to pay the
whole of his debts, or if a man promise to perform a secret trust,
or a trust void for want of writing, by the statute of frauds,-m
such and many other instances, though the promise gives a com-
pulsory remedy where there was none before, either in law or
*Of the Seattle Bar.
IBouvIEn, LAW DICTIONARY.
1 Comp. 284 (1775).
21 Comp. 290 (1782).
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equity, yet, as the promise is only to do what an honest man ought
to do, the ties of conscience upon an upright mind is a sufficient
consideration."
As thus used the term "moral obligation" seems to have origi-
nally been understood as being synonymous with ethical obligation,
being broad enough to cover even those promises unconnected with
any antecedent obligation whatsoever. But it is interesting to notice
that although the language is that way, the actual cases decided by
Lord Mansfield are those in which there was some kind of a former
legal obligation, and, query, therefore, whether they are authority
for the broad proposition that moral obligation is sufficient regard-
less of a previous legal consideration.
For almost fifty years the sufficiency of a moral obligation to
support a promise was recognized in England. The rule was applied
in early cases to a promise by the overseers of the poor to pay for
expenses incurred in administering to a pauper,4 a promise by an
executor to pay a pecuniary legacy out of assets sufficient for the
purpose,5 and a promise by a widow to reimburse one who had
paid money to a third person at her request during her coverture0
However, the doctrine as such proved too broad and elusive to en-
dure for any length of time and was challenged and practically
overthrown by a note to the case of Wennall v. Adney, where the
writer points out that in the instances adduced by Lord Mansfield
as illustrative of the rule of law announced by him the party
bound by the promise had received a benefit previous to the
promise, and, after discussing some of the other cases, lays down
the doctrine or rule, which has been very generally approved and
adopted by the courts as follows. "An express promise, therefore,
as it should seem, can only revive a precedent good consideration
which nght have been enforced at law through the medium of an
implied promise, had it not been suspended by some positive rule
of law, but can give no original right of action if the obligation
on which it is founded never could have been enforced at law,
though not barred by any legal maxim or statute provision."
This early restriction upon Lord Mansfield's broad view has
likewise been approved in the majority of American jurisdictions,
and at the present day there can be no doubt that the doctrine of
moral consideration in the broad form originally announced is
wholly discredited in England and most of the United States. In
Leake on Contractss the author says "A doctrine formerly pre-
'Watson v. Turner Bell N. P 129 (1767).5 Atk ns v. Hill, 1 Comp. 284 (1775).
CLee v. Muggertdge, 5 Taunt. 36 (1813).
3 Bos. & P. 249 (1802).
' 6th Ed., p. 443.
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vailed that an express promise moved by a previously existing
moral obligation furmshed sufficient consideration to create a valid
contract. But it is obvious that a promise moved by a sense of moral
obligation only is simply voluntary, and it is now settled, in accord-
ance with the general rule, that no valid contract arises from it."
These courts recognize, it is true, the validity of various promises
that are based on obligations which are merely moral in the sense
that at the tne of the promise there is no enforceable liability9
But such moral obligations are distinguishable from purely ethical
obligations since there exists an antecedent barred or unenforceable
obligation. Hence it would seem that moral obligation has no place
in the doctrine of consideration, for if morality was to be the
guide, every promise would be enforced, because there is a moral
obligation to perform every promise, and if the existence of a past
moral obligation is to be the test, every promine which merely re-
peats a prior gratuitous promise would be enforceable.
Nevertheless the doctrine still survives in a few states today In
Georgia the Code"0 provides that either a "natural duty and af-
fection" or a "strong moral obligation" is a good consideration,
but the courts tend to construe the statute rather strictly, and to
restrict its application to cases in which there is an antecedent
obligation." A Louisiana statute" provides that a "natural obliga-
tion" shall be sufficient to support a promise, and, although it
prescribes that such "natural obligations" are of four kinds, a
recent federal decision 3 has construed this statute to be merely
illustrative and not conclusive. And this decision would appear
to be in accord with the tendency in Louisiana to enlarge the
field of moral obligations rather than to restrict the application
of the doctrine to the generally established exceptions.14 In Illi-
nois,' 5 Maryland,'6 Michigan ' 7 and, especially in Pennsylvania 8
the doctrine still persists to a limited extent. 9
'1 IuOTr, CONTRACTS, § 212, p. 352; 1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS, § 148, p.
329, § 160, p. 347 and cases cited in 53 L. R. A. 353; 26 L. R. A. (NiS.) 520.
10 GA. CIVIL CODE, 1911, § 4243.
nMcElven v. Sloan & Co., 56 Ga. 208 (1876) Helmer v. Helmer, 159
Ga. 376, 125 S. E. 849 (1924).
2MERRICK'S REv. CIV. CODE OF LA. 2nd Ed., art. 1758-1759.
"In Re Atk''s Estate, 30 Fed. (2d) 761 (1929).
'Bartha v. Succession of Lacroix, 29 La. Ann. 326, 29 Ain. Rep. 330 (1877).
IALawrence v. Oglesby, 178 Ill. 122, 52 N. E. 945 (1899).
"Pool v. Homer, 64 M&L 131, 20 Atl. 1036 (1885). An original contract
void because of the statute of frauds is sufficient consideration when per-
formed to uphold a subsequent valid pronase made by the defendant.
"Edwards v. Nelson, 51 Mich. 121, 16 N. W 261 (1883). The moral
obligation to pay a debt discharged in bankruptcy is sufficient considera-
tion to support a written contract for payment executed by the debtor.
"Anderson v. Best, 176 Pa. 498, 35 Atl. 194 (1896). A subsequent writ-
ten promise .by defendant to perform an originally unenforceable prom-se
is supported -by sufficient moral consideration and is enforceable.
' 1 WrrMuSTON, CONTRACTS, § 149, p. 331, 1 ELioTT, CONTRACTS, § 211,vp. 346.
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The cases presenting the problem of whether a moral obligation
will sustain an express promise may best be divided into four
classes. (1) Cases in which the moral obligation arose wholly from
ethical considerations, unconnected with any legal obligation, and
without the receipt of actual pecuniary or material benefit by the
promisor, though there may have been actual pecuniary detriment
to the promisee, (2) cases in which the moral obligation arose out
of or was connected with a previous request or promise creating
originally an enforceable legal liability, which, however, at the time
of the subsequent express promise, had become discharged or barred
by operation of a positive rule of law, so that at that time there
was no enforceable legal liability, (3) cases in which the moral
obligation arose from or was connected with a previous request or
promise, but which never created any legal liability, because of a
rule of law which rendered the original contract void or unenforce-
able, (4) cases in which the moral obligation arose out of or was
connected with the receipt of actual material or pecuniary benefit
by the promisor, without, however, any previous request or promise
on ins part, express or implied, and, therefore, of course, without
any original legal liability 20
I. MORAL OBLIGATION UNCONNECTED WITH ANY MATERIAL OR
PECUNIARY BENEFIT TO THE PROMISOR
Moral obligations of this class, which can be referred to as pure
moral obligations, represent the doctrine in its broadest sense, and
it is settled under the authorities that such obligations create no
consideration for a subsequent promise. 21 A particularly good il-
lustration of this point is furnished by the early Massachusetts
case of Mills v. WyjnM 22 wherein it was held that a promise by a
father to pay the expense previously incurred by a stranger in
caring for his son who was of majority and had ceased to be a
member of his father's family, he having suddenly been taken sick
and being poor, was unenforceable for want of consideration. In
the course of the opinion the court said "The general position
that moral obligation is a sufficient consideration for an express
promise is to be limited in its application to cases where at some
time or other a good or valuable consideration has existed. "123 The
10 This classification is taken from a note in 26 L. R. A. (N. S.) 520.
2'1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS, § 148, p. 329; 1 ELLIOTT, CONTRACTS, § 211,
p. 346.
'3 Pick. (Mass.) 207 (1825).
In Freeman v. Dodge, 98 Me. 536, 57 At. 884, 66 L. R. A. 395 (1904)
the court in holding that the moral obligation resting upon a son to
reimburse a town for past expenses incurred for the relief of his pauper-
ized mother is not a sufficient consideration for his promise to pay the
same said: "A mere moral obligation, or, as it is sometimes rather loosely
stated, a moral obligation not founded. upon an antecedent legal liability,
is not sufficient consideration for a promase."
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reason for the rule announced by the Massachusetts court seems
to be sound, for, since the test of such obligations would vary with
the morals of every individual, the uncertainties to which such a
doctrine might lead necessarily preclude its application.
No cases have been discovered in this jurisdiction falling within
this class, and although the Washington court gives to the doctrine
a wider application than some jurisdietions, as will subsequently
appear, it is the writer's opinion that the court would not extend
the doctrine so as to include cases within this classification.
There is, however, at least one jurisdiction recognizing that
ethical motives, unconnected with a legal liability, or the receipt
of actual pecuniary or material benefit are valid consideration, for
the Pennsylvania court in the case of Hemphill 'V. McClimons24 in
support of the doctrine used these emphatic words "There is no
authority anywhere which requires us to zar the simplicity of the
plain rule which says that a moral obligation is a sufficient con-
sideration for a direct promise, and we affirm this to be a moral
obligation, because the common sense of all mankind affirms that
it cannot be violated without moral guilt." And in the later case of
Bentley v. Lamb"-2 the court reached the extreme conclusion that
when a promisor makes one promise, and has thus created the duty
to do the act promised, while this promise may be unenforceable as
without consideration, yet if in pursuance of this now existing
moral duty, he makes a second promise to do the act formerly
promised, an action may be brought on this second promise, and
the moral obligation will serve as a sufficient consideration. 26
II. MORAL OBLIGATION ARISING FROM A FoRMER LEGAL
LIABILITY NO LONGER ENFORCEABLE
Some of the cases hold that it is only where there was at one
time a legal liability which, by operation of law, has become un-
enforceable, that a moral obligation is sufficient to sustain a subse-
quent express promise. However that may be, it is now well settled
that a promise to pay a debt barred by the atatute of limitations
or one discharged in bankruptcy is binding, without additional
consideration on the side of the promisee being necessary 27
A few of the courts reach this result by saying that the moral
obligation to pay the indebtedness after the bar of the statute, or
after the discharge in bankruptcy, is sufficient to support the ex-
press promise to do so. Thus, in the case of Brown v. Akenson 28 the
2424 Pa. 367 (1855).
-112 Pa. 480, 4 Ai. 200 (1886).
2Marshall v. Marshall, 61 Pa. Sup. Ct. 513 (1915) Zumbra v. ZuTmbra,
69 Pa. Sup. Ct. 600 (1918).
21 See note 9.
1174 Ken. 301, 86 Pac. 299 (1906).
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moral obligation of a debtor to pay a judgment which had become
dormant was held to be a valid consideration to support a new
promise, it being a moral duty based upon an antecedent legal
obligation which had been extinguished, but never performed. The
New Jersey court in the case of Stewart v. Reckless29 followed this
theory and in explanation thereof said "A discharge in bank-
ruptcy extinguishes a debt, and nothing remains of legal liability,
but as the debt has been discharged, not by payment or act of the
creditor, but by the operation of law, there remains a moral obliga-
tion sufficient to support a new promise to pay, but the new con-
tract is the foundation of the act, and not the former indebted-
ness."
Other courts take the view that the validity of the new promise
is not based upon the ground of moral obligation, but upon the
right of a party to waive the protection of a statute relieving him
from indebtedness, in other words, that the discharge merely barred
the remedy and did not extinguish the debt. But under either
theory the obligation is a moral one in the broad sense in which
that phrase is here used, and this type of case, therefore, falls
within the proper scope of this article.
In Washington, when there has been a new promise by the
debtor to pay after a discharge in bankruptcy, the cases consistently
hold that the new promise merely revives the old obligation, since
the discharge in bankruptcy did not destroy the debt but only
deprived the creditor of his legal remedy In the early case of Coe
v Rosene30 the bankrupt wrote a letter to the creditor, after the
petition had been filed, in which he stated that he had paid some
and expected to pay more of his discharged debts, and specified the
obligation that he intended to next take up. In a second letter to
the creditor he indicated that he would hold the pronse good, but
was uncertain when he could make the payments. The creditor
subsequently brought suit alleging that such letters contained a
sufficient promise to revive the debt. The court in holding that
the new promise was not sufficiently clear, distinct and unequivocal
to revive the debt said "The authorities all agree upon two propo-
sitions (1) In order to revbve a debt9 ' discharged in bankruptcy
proceedings, the new promise must be clear, distinct and unequivo-
cal as well as certain and unambiguous. Our own cases, in discuss-
ing the nature of the promise necessary to defeat the bar of the
statute of limitations, establish this rule." The court again mci-
dentally touched upon this point in the latter case of Vason v.
- 24 N.J.L. 427 (1854).
30 66 Wash. 73, 118 Pac. 881 (1911).3, Author's italics.
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Fit 32 and reaffirmed the rule of the Coe case that the new promise
merely revives the old debt." Finally m the case of Parker v.
Smith 34 the court was forced to pass squarely upon this question
as to the effect of the new promise after the discharge in bank-
ruptcy and agam the result reached was that the new promise
revived the old debt. Judge Fullerton speaking for the court said
"The question whether the court erred in its allowance of an at-
torney's fee depends upon the legal effect that is to be given to a
promise to pay a debt discharged in bankruptcy The courts are
not in accord on the question. Some maintain that the promise
creates a new obligation, which finds its consideration in the old
debt, and that the cause of action rests upon the new promise and
not on the old debt, while others maintain that the new promise but
revives the old obligation, and that the action rests upon the old
obligation. Insofar as we have spoken on the question, we have
adopted the latter view, and we are content to accept the conclusion
as final. Since, therefore, the new promise revived the old obligation,
it revived it as a whole. " And this question similarly came be-
for the upper court in the case of Brennen v. BolotWn, and a like
conclusion was reached, the court citing Coe v. Rosene with ap-
proval.
But the theory upon which the Washington court bases its de-
cision in those cases where the debtor promises to pay after the
statute of limitations has barred the claim is not so clear, and an
examination of the cases shows a. conflict in the reasoning employed.
Quaker City National Bank of Philadelphia v. The City of Tacoma 8
was one of the earliest cases raising the question in this jurisdic-
tion. The plaintiff was the holder of a warrant issued by the City
of Tacoma and payable only out of a special improvement fund.
He sought a writ of mandate against the city and its treasurer to
enforce the payment of the warrant, and the defense alleged, among
others, was that the claim was barred by the statute of limitations.
The court readily reached the sound conclusion that a subsequent
promise to pay removes the bar of the statute of limitations, but
gave no definite theory upon which this result was based.3 7 How-
0114 Wash. 11, 194 Pac. 545 (1921).
"Id. at 13, 194 Pac. at 546. "It is vigorously contended that the aotion
was barred by the discharge in bankruptcy, and- it seems to dbe well settled
that a partial payment made thereafter will not revive a debt discharged
in bankruptcy. * * * It appears to be equally as well settled, however,
that a new promise made after the filing of the petition will revive the
debt. * * *"
14144 Wash. 24, 255 Pac. 1026 (1927).
"148 Wash. 263, 268 Pac. 418 (1928).
427 Wash. 259, 67 Pac. 710 (1902).
31Id. at 264, 67 Pac. at 711. Judge Fullerton said: "While it Is true
there was no legal obligation to pay the warrant on the part of the city
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ever, several months later in the same year the court in Liberman
v. Gurensky3s definitely held that the acknowledgment or promise
made after the bar of the statute created a new contract, the credi-
tor suing thereon having the burden of establishing the particular
debt to which the acknowledgment or promise referred to. In
adopting this theory the court quoted from the earlier case of
Stubblefield v. McAuliff9 in which the court had said that part
payment was equivalent to the making of a new contract based
upon an old consideration. And the Stubblefield case has subse-
quently been cited by the Washington court with approval in the
cases of Bassett v Turall,40 Farmers and Mechanics Bank v San
Poil Consolidated Company,41 Catlin v. Mills, 2 and Hoddard v.
Chapin.4
3
In the case of Arthur and Company v. Burke44 this question was
thoroughly considered by the court and the conclusion there reached
was that the subsequent acknowledgment of the debt raised a new
implied promise to pay, supported by the original consideration.4
In Eureka Cedar Lumber & Shingle Company v. Knoch46 the court
used the following language in its discussion of the common law
rules of part payment as codified in this jurisdiction "It is ele-
mentary that the statute does not affect the legal existence of the
contract but only the remedy, hence it is plain that a payment
upon such contract is a payment upon a legally existing contract,47
and, therefore, extends the running, or removes the bar, of the
statute, regardless of the time of payment." In Belcher v. Tacoma
which the law would enforce at the time the subsequent promise was
made, yet it cannot be said there was no consideration for the subsequent
promise, or that it was a mere gratuity It is a general principle that
whoever is capable of entering into a contract to compensate another for
a service performed or an advancement made may, by a promise made
subsequent to the performance of the service, or the making of the a&
vancement, hyind himself to make such compensation. The power to make
the contract is at the basis of the liability, and the performance of the
act furnishes the consideration."
'"27 Wash. 410, 67 Pac. 998 (1902).
"20 Wash. 442, 55 Pac. 637 (1898).
'021 Wash. 231, 57 Pac. 806 (1899). (Action against a surety upon a
promissory note).
" 126 Wash. 137, 217 Pac. 707 (1923). (Payment made by one of two
joint makers on a promissory note).
12 140 Wash. 1, 247 Pac. 1013 (1926) (Payment of interest -by the hus-
band upon a community note after the statute of limitations has run).
" 153 Wash. 163, 279 Pac. 583 (1929) (Payment on a joint debt by one
of two joint debtors).
"83 Wash. 690, 145 Pac. 974 (1915).
" Id. at 694, 145 Pac. at 976. "The .payment must ,be made under such
circumstances as to show an intentional acknowledgement by the debtor
of his liability for the whole debt as of the date of the payment, from
which arises a new implied promise, supported by the original consider-
ation, to pay the residue."
- 95 Wash. 339, 163 Pac. 753 (1917).
"Author's 
-italics.
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Eastern Railroad C0.48 the defendant railroad received the aid
of the public service commission to cancel switching charges which
were admitted to be unjust and discriminatory The railroad there-
after sought to invoke the statute of limitations requiring all claims
for overcharges to be filed with the commission within two years
from the time the cause of action accrued. Judge Webster in read-
ing the opinion of the court made this pertinent statement "The
petition therefore amounted to a new promise supported by the
moral obligation to pay, and revived the claims." To the writer's
knowledge this is the first direct reference made to moral consid-
eration in the bankruptcy or statute of limitation eases, and in so
doing the court cited the famous case of Muir v. Kane.4 a
But in a little over a year the court had reverted to its former
position originally set out in the Stubblefield case, and reached the
conclusion in the case of Zuhn v. Horst4" that the subsequent
promise created a new contract upon which the debtor would be
bound. In the concluding part of the opinion this expressive lan-
guage appears "When the new promise was made. it created a
new contract upon which, and upon which only the action can be
maintaned.5 That new contract, like every other contract, must
have the essential elements of a contract before it can be enforced.
The essential element of such a contract, under our statute, is
that the promise must be in writing. Respondent seeks to avoid
the rule by contending that, notwithstanding the bar of the statute
upon the first promise, the original claim and cause of action fur-
nished a sufficient consideration for the new promise. The trouble
with this contention is that it is not lack of consideration but lack
of contract, that bars the respondent's right of recovery So
with respondent's contention that the case falls within the rule of
Muir v. Kane that a moral obligation is sufficient to support a new
promise. When correctly applied the rule announced in Muzr
v. Kane is admitted, but it has no application here for reasons
given. "
In the more recent decisions the court seems to have adopted
the theory set out in the above quotation of the Zuhn case, for in
Griffin v. Lear5 it was held that the acknowledgment made after
the statute of limitations had run gave rise to a new cause of action,
for which the old debt was the consideration.5 2 And the latest ex-
"99 Wash. 34, 168 Pac. 782 (1917).
"a. 55 Wash. 131, 104 Pac. 153, 26 L. R. A. (N.S.) 519, 19 Am. Cas. 1180
(1909), cited note 67, snfra.
"1100 Wash. 359, 170 Pac. 1033 (1918).
*
0Author's italics.
1123 Wash. 191, 212 Pac. 271 (1923).
Pinnell v. Copps, 149 Wash. 578, 271 Pac. 882 (1928) Abrahamson
v. Payne, 159 Wash. 516, 293 Pac. 985 (1930).
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pression of the court on this question is found in the case of Tucker
v. Guerrzer5 3 in which the court quoted the following passage from
the Griffin case with approval. "But where the acknowledgement
is made after the statute has already run, the action mUst be upon
the new agreement, consequently it is in the nature of an original
obligation and should be strictly construed."
The Washington court, as previously pointed out, has used
conflicting reasoning in sustaining and enforcing the subsequent
promise to pay after the debt has been barred by the statute of
limitations. Numerically speaking, however, the theory that the
subsequent promise or acknowledgment gives rise to a new cause
of action (contract) prevails, and seems to have more often met
with the court's approval, especially in the later decisions.
III. MORAL OBLIGATION ARiSING FROM RECEIPT OF MATERIAL OR
FINANCIAL BENEFIT, WITHOUT ANY ORIGINAL
LEGAL LIABILITY
As will appear the authorities are not in harmony upon the ques-
tion whether the moral obligation arising from or connected with,
a contract void ab snitw, will constitute a consideration for an
executory promise. A distinction is to be observed between a con-
tract originally void, and one not originally void, though voidable
or unenforceable. The cases are agreed, in the absence of a statute
to the contrary, that an infant's contract, being voidable only,
may be effectively ratified after majority without a new consider-
ation.5 4 And since it is entirely within one's power upon attaining
majority to avoid contracts made during minority, the new promise
or other act upon which a ratification is predicted does in a sense
rest upon a moral obligation, and the rule exemplifies the principle
which admits the sufficiency of some kinds of moral obligation to
support a contract. Although the courts have occasionally used
that element in its support the rule is generally declared and ap-
plied without explicit reference to moral obligation. On the other
hand there is a conflict of authority as regards a new promise after
the removal of disqualification of coverture, based upon a void
contract during coverture. 5' So also is there a conflict as regards the
sufficiency of the moral obligation arising from or connected with,
an original promise within the statute of frauds, to support a new
promise."
The view that the moral obligation resting upon one who has
- 170 Whsh. 165, 15 Pac. (2d) 936 (1932).
" 1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS, § 151, p. 335, RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS, § 89,
p. 110.
6s 1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS, § 156, cases collected in 17 A. L. R. 1341.
"1 ELLIOTT, CONTRACTS, § 212.
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made a void contract, because not in writing as required by the
statute of frauds, would not furnish consideration for a new
promise in writing was adopted in the often cited and leading New
Jersey case of Stout v. Humphrey,57 wherein it was held that a
subsequent promise to pay for services of a broker in procuring a
sale was without consideration, when the original contract was not
in writing, as required by the statute.5 8 It is interesting to notice
that this court made a distinction between contracts formerly good,
but on which the right of recovery has been barred by the statute,
and those contracts that are barred in the first instance because
of some legal defect in their execution, holding that the former
will furmsh a consideration for a subsequent promise to perform,
while the latter will not. Other jurisdictions clearly following the
rule of the New Jersey Court are the federal courts,59 Alabama,6
Connecticut, 61 Illinois,6 2 Maine,63 Michigan," New York,6 5 and Wis-
consn. 66
Six years after the Stout case the Washington court was called
upon to decide a. case, the pertinent facts of which were identical
6' 69 N. J. L. 436, 55 Atl. 281 (1903).
14 Ibid. In the course of its opinion the court said: "It is clear that
if a contract between two 'parties be void, and not merely voidable, no
subsequent express promise will operate to charge the party promising,
even though he has derived the benefit of the contract. Yet, according to
the commonly conceived notion respecting moral obligations, and the force
attributed to a subsequent express promise, such a person ought to pay.
An express promise, therefore, as it should seem, can only revive a pre-
cedent good consideration which might have .been enforced at law through
the medium of an implied promise had it not 'been suspended by some
positive rule of law, but can give no original, right of action if the obliga-
tion on which it Is founded never could have been enforced at law, though
not barred 'by any legal maxim or statute provision."
rLloyd v. Fulton, 91 U. S. 479, 23 L. Ed. 363 (1876).
CAgee v. Steele, 8 Ala. 948 (1846).
North v. Forest, 15 Conn. 400 (1843). The court Temarked: "But, it
Is said, the defendant was under a moral obligation to fulfill the contract,
and that a discharge from such obligation is a sufficient consideration.
It is true there are certain cases where a moral obligation has been
holden a sufficient consideration to support an express promise; as,
where there has -been an antecedent liability which has 'been removed by
some subsequent events or proceedings, such as a debt barred -by the
statute of limitations, or discharged 'by a certificate of bankruptcy a
subsequent -promise 'by the debtor may 'be enforced. Now, in the case
under consideration, there never was any legal liability resting upon the
defendant ,to fulfill his contract for the purchase of the stock. Nor has he
ever received any of the property of the plaintiff. The case, therefore, does
not fall within principles recognized in the cases eited6 where the moral
obligation has -been holden sufficient."
uHuey v. Frank, 182 Ill. App. 431 (1913) Richardson v. Richardson.
148 Ill. 563, 26 L. I. A. 305, 36 N. E. 608 (1893).
c'Farnham v. O'Brien, 22 Me. 475 (1843).
"Hal v. Soule, 11 Mich. 494 (1863). But see Bogreff v. Prokopik, 212
Mich. 265, 180 N. W 427, 17 A. L. 1- 1292 (1920).
"Allen v. Scarff, 1 Hilt. 209 (1856).
"Nichols v. Mitchell, 30 Wis. 329 (1872).
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therewith. The action in Mutr v. Kane67 was likewise brought by
a broker to recover his commission. He had originally entered into
an oral agreement to sell property for the defendant, but after
completing the sale, a written contract was executed whereby the
defendant agreed to pay two hundred dollars as compensation for
the complete services. The defendant contended that because the
statute declares such an agreement void unless in writing,6 the
subsequent services furnished no consideration for the written
promise, relying strongly upon the Stout case. Judge Fullerton
in delivering the forceful opinion of the court conclusively placed
Washington in that class of jurisdictions recognizing moral con-
sideration. He said, referring to the case of Stout v. Humphrey
"That court makes a distinction between contracts formerly good
but on which the right of recovery has been barred by the statute,
and those contracts which are barred in the first instance because
of some legal defect in their execution, holding that the former will
furnish a consideration for a subsequent promise to perform, while
the latter will not. It has seemed to us that this distinction is not
sound. The moral obligation to pay for services rendered as a
broker in selling real estate, under an oral contract where the
statute requires such contracts to be in writing, is just as binding
as is the moral obligation to pay a debt that has become barred
by the statute of limitations, and there is no reason for holding
that the latter will support a new promise to pay while the former
will not. There is no moral delinquency that attaches to an oral
contract to sell real property as a broker. This service cannot be
recovered for because the statute says the promise must be in writ-
ing; not because it is illegal in itself. It was not intended by the
statute to impute moral turpitude to such contracts. The statute
was intended to prevent frauds and perjuries, and to accomplish
that purpose, it is required that the evidence of the contract be in
writing, but it is not conducive to either fraud or perjury to say
that the services rendered under the void contract, or voluntarily,
will support a subsequent written promise to pay for such service.
Nor is it a valid objection to say there was no antecedent legal con-
sideration. The validity of a promise to pay a debt barred by the
statute of limitations is not founded on its antecedent legal obli-
1155 Wash. 131, 104 Pac. 153, 26 L. R. A. (N. S.) 519, 19 Ann. Cas. 1180
(1909).
" REM. REV. STAT. § 5825. "In ,the following cases specified in this sec
tion, any agreement, contract and promise shall be void, unless such
agreement, contract or promise, or some note or memorandum thereof, be
in writing, and signed by the party to be charged therewith, or by some
person thereunto -by him lawfully authorized, that is to say- * * * *
(5) an agreement authorizing or employing an agent or -broker to sell
or purchase real estate for compensation or a commission."
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gation. There is no legal obligation to pay such a debt, if there
were there would be no need- for the new promise. The obligation
is moral solely, and since there can be no difference in character
between one moral obligation and another, there can be no reason
for holding that one moral obligation will support a promise while
another will not."
It is interesting to note that the Washington statute of frauds
declares such promises absolutely void (and not merely voidable)
unless they are in writing. Yet Judge Fullerton in the course of
his opinion overcomes the express effect of the statute and never-
theless allows a recovery, basing his decision chiefly upon the ex-
istence of a moral obligation to pay However, this case settled once
and for all the law in Washington as to this particular problem,
but a search through the reports reveals that the court, with few
exceptions, confines itself in its discussion of moral obligation and
consideration to this one factual set-up. In the case of Henneberg
v. Cook"9 the court reasserted the doctrine of the Muir case where
the identical facts were involved, and when the later case of
Grant v. Ten Hope0 arose presenting a similar problem the court
recognized as undisputed law in this state the rule of the Muir
case. 7 - The latest expression of the court on this question is found
m the case of Realty Mart Corp. v. Standrng,72 in which Judge
Beals dismissed the problem with this curt language "Recovery
upon such a contract was first upheld by this court in the case of
Muir v. Kane, in which case the court held that an oral contract
to pay a commission, void under the statute of frauds, amounted
to a moral obligation and was a sufficient consideration, the services
having been rendered to support a subsequent written agreement
to pay therefor. In the recent case of Sams v. Olympa Holding
Co., 153 Wash. 254, 279 Pac. 575, the cases cited and other decisions
of this court were referred to and the rule reaffirmed, although a
recovery was not allowed in that instance."
Other jurisdictions which have definitely held that a considera-
tion which will support a subsequent executory promise may arise
from an agreement that, prior to that promise, was unenforceable
because of the statute of frauds, or from' the antecedent receipt of
eg 103 Wash. 685, 175 Pac. 313 (1918).
10 117 Wash. 531, 201 Pac. 750 (1921).
White v. Panama Lumber and Shingle Co., 129 Wash. 189, 224 Pac.
563 (1924) Sains v. Olympta Holding Go., 153 Wash. 254, 279 Pac. 575
(1929) Bethel v. Preston, 157 Wash. 652, 290 Pac. 224 (1930) Palmer V.
Stanwood Land Co., 158 Wash. 487, 291 Pac. 342 (1930) Peeples v. British
Am. Consolidated Properties, 163 Wash. 353, 1 Pac. (Ud,) 235 (1931)
Johnson v. Savage, 163 Wash. 478, 1 Pac. (2d) 890 (1931).
2 165 Wash. 21, 4 Pac. (2d) 1101 (1931).
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material benefit by the promisor thereunder are California,7 3
Indiana,74 Iowa,7 Kansas,76 Maryland, 77 Minnesota
7 8 Missouri,'7
Nebraska, 0 Pennsylvania,8 ' and South Dakota.82
IV WHERE THE PRomisoR RECEIVED MATERIAL OR PECUNIARY
BENEFIT WITHOUT ANY ANTECEDENT PROMISE
It is clear, if, as held in the Stout case, moral obligations of the
third class are not sufficient to sustain the subsequent express
promise to pay, that moral obligations of the fourth class are like-
wise insufficient for that purpose. The statement often made as to
the insufficiency of a past consideration to support a present execu-
tory promise is probably true in many cases such as where, though
there was a benefit to the promisor, it was conferred under such
circumstances as to show that it was to be rendered gratuitously
There is a conflict as to whether the voluntary payment of another's
debt without his request is sufficient to uphold a subsequent ex-
press promise to reimburse the person making the payment.8 3 Such
a promise has been enforced in some cases where the payment,
when made, was not intended to be gratuitous."4 It is well settled
that money paid by one person for the use of another does not
necessarily impose a liability upon the latter. 85 Where, however,
the consideration is beneficial to the party sought to be held, and
is accepted by him, that person can be said to become the pronisor's
agent by the adoption of his act by the latter, and this fact of
ratification warrants the implication of a previous request.8 ,
Although many cases hold that past services are insufficient to
support a subsequent executory promise, 7 some being authority
against the rule that the moral obligation arising from the benefit
13 Carrzngton v. Snaithers, 26 Cal. App. 460, 147 Pac. 225 (1915).
71 Wills v. Ross, 77 Ind. 1, 40 Ant Rep. 279 (1881).
"Daily v. Minntch, 117 Iowa 563, 91 N. W 913, 60 L. R. A. 840 (1902).
71Stout v. Ennu', 28 Kan. 706 (1882).
-7 Poole v. Homer 64 Md. 131, 20 Atl. 1036 (1885).
'
8Rogers v. Stevenson, 16 Minn. 68 (1870).
"Nelson v. Dzffenderifer 178 Mo. App. 48, 163 S. W 271 (1914).
8"Mohr v. Richgauer 82 Neb. 398, 117 N. W 950, 26 L. R. A. (N. S.)
533 (1909).
"Anderson v. Best, 176 Pa. 498, 35 Atl. 194 (1896).
12Rank n v. Matthtesen, 10 S. D. 628, 75 N. W 196 (1898).
3 See note and cases in 17 A. L. R. 1359.
81 See Prtce v. Towsey, 3 Litt. (Ky.) 423, 14 Am. Dec. 81 (1823), where
it was held that the voluntary vayment of another's debt does not of itself
give the person paying the same a right of action against a debtor, but
constitutes a sufficient consideration to uphold a subsequent agreement
by the latter to repay the former, the subsequent promise being equivalent
to a previous request.
"1 'IiMOT, CONTRACTS, §§ 213, 214 and cases collected therein.
so1 EILLIOTT, CONTRACTS, §§ 213, 214.
517 A. L. R. 1366 and cases cited, 1 ELLIOTT, CONTACTS, § 213, p. 359" 1
WILLISTON, CONTRACTS, § 144, p. 323.
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conferred upon the promisor by the past services, will furnish con-
sideration for a later executory promise, other cases take the con-
trary view that a moral obligation arises on the promisor to pay
therefor, which will support a subsequent executory promIse to
do so, although there was no legal liability previous to such
promise."" But the effect of many of these cases given to illustrate
the view that past services will not support an executory promise
is often nullified by the circumstances, especially by the fact that
the services were intended to be gratuitous.
In the case of Olsen v. Hagan"9 the Washington Supreme Court
held that a promise by a wife to her dying husband to pay a certain
sum to a third person who had lived m their household and rend-
ered services to them, even though one incapable of being enforced,
created a moral obligation which sustained a subsequent promise
by her to such third person, thereby flatly recognizing the suffi-
ciency of moral consideration in this type of case. Judge Fuller-
ton again wrote the opinion for the court and by the language
used left no doubt as to the conclusion reached or the reasoning
used. He said. "There is no proof of an express contract by Mrs.
Wharton to pay Hooker for his services, other than her statement
to hin, at the time of delivering the notes for $10,000, that it was
in accordance with a promise to her husband to compensate him
for his past services, nor is there anything in the evidence show-
mg an implied contract by Mrs. Wharton to remunerate Hooker
upon which an action of quantum meruit could be based. Her
promise to her dying husband in 1908 to pay the sum named to
Hooker, even if one incapable of enforcement by Hooker, was a
moral obligation on her part to carry out. Such obligation consti-
tuted a consideration for her promise to Hooker to give him that
sum. We think this promise of M~rs. Wharton to pay Hooker
$10,000 unquestionably, under the circumstances, constituted a debt
for which she was liable." Six months later the case came up for
a rehearing" and was at that time reaffirmed. Since then (as near
as the writer can determine) no analagous case has been passed
upon by our court. Whether the court, if called upon to decide a
case involving similar facts, would reach the same result is a m'at-
ter of conjecture.
However, a very recent case in this jurisdiction 9' indicates the
present attitude of the court concerning the question of moral obli-
gation. In that case the plaintiff, as agent of the defendant, effected
"See cases coflectedn 26 L. I A.. (N. S.) 526; 17 A. L. R. 1366.
102 Wash. 321, 172 Pac. 1173 (1918).
105 Wash. 698, 178 Pac. 451 (1919).
"Irons Investment Co. v. Richardson, 84 Wash. Dec. 82; 50 P (24) 42
(1935).
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the sub-leasing of a piece of property and in consideration of said
services the defendant signed an instrument in which he recog-
nized as due and owing the plaintiff the sum of $1500.00, payable
upon the happening of a further contingency Thereafter the
plaintiff demanded payment of the sum and the demand was re-
fused. It is important to notice that the services rendered by plain-
tiff were performed prior to the execution of this written instru-
ment, and prior to the time that plaintiff's license to act as a real
estate broker was obtained.
The plaintiff, in order to recover, had to explain his non-com-
pliance with the real estate brokers' act, and hence argued that
the services were performed without any promise of compensation,
but simply as a gratuitous favor. The court, in discussing the case,
adopted the plaintiff's contention, but allowed no recovery, since
there was no consideration for the subsequent promise. The court
said "We have, then a subsequent written agreement to pay for
services rendered gratuitously But there was no consideration for
such agreement. It could not be contended that there was any legal
obligation resting on respondent to pay for the services, m the
absence of any promise, express or implied, to pay for them. Nor,
under the circumstances, was there any moral obligation to pay
therefor. A past consideration, even though of benefit to the
promisor, is insufficient when the services rendered are intended
and expected to be gratuitous. 0 ' To say that there is a moral
obligation to pay for services intended as a gratuity, is in itself
inconsistent and contradictory
"It is true that this court has adopted the rule that, under cer-
tain circumstances, a moral obligation will support a subsequent
promise to perform. Quaker City National Bamnk v. Tacoma, 27
Wash. 259, 67 Pac. 710, Muir v. Kane, 55 Wash. 131, 104 Pac. 153,
26 L. R. A. (N. S.) 519, Olsen v. Hagan, 102 Wash. 321, 172 Pac.
1173, affirmed on rehearing in 105 Wash. 698, 178 Pac. 451, Hen-
neberg v. Cook, 103 Wash. 685, 175 Pac. 313, White v. Panama
Lbr & Shingle Co., 129 Wash. 189, 224 Pac. 563, Sams v. Olympsa
Holding Co., 153 Wash. 254, 279 Pac. 575, Palmer v. Stanwood
Land Co., 158 Wash. 487, 291 Pac. 342. But in each of those cases
it was established that there was indeed an antecedent moral obli-
gation on the part of the promisor to do the thing that he subse-
quently agreed in writing to do."
The language used in this case seems to indicate that the court
has now adopted the view that before a moral obligation will be
sufficient consideration to support a subsequent promise to per
form, it is necessary that there be an antecedent moral obligation
on the part of the promisor to do the act that he subsequently
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agrees to perform. Therefore, if the services originally rendered
were intended as a gratuity, a subsequent promise to pay therefor
will not in itself be enforceable, and in such cases the mere moral
obligation to perform will not be sufficient consideration.
CONCLUSION
While it is impossible to reconcile all of the cases decided in this
field, the general tendency is to deny the validity of a promise, the
only consideration for which is the moral obligation to perform,
and, therefore, the courts in most of the United States, as in Eng-
land, have rejected the principle of moral consideration. However,
this doctrine is still employed by some courts m upholding and
explaining certain rules of law, and, as we have seen, the Wash-
ington court is one of those which refuses entirely to discard Lord
Mansfield's theory, for when the proper factual situation arises
our court does not hesitate to rest its disposition of the case upon
that doctrine.
